National parliaments have often been described as latecomers to European integration
Introduction
The role of national legislatures in the political system of the European Union (EU) first received serious political and academic attention in the mid-1990s in connection with debates on how to cure the EU's democratic deficit.
1 Academic interest in the topic drew further inspiration from the first comparative projects that showed domestic legislatures to be largely ineffective or uninterested in controlling their governments in EU matters (among many: Laursen & Pappas, 1995; Norton, 1996) . Since then, the role of national parliaments has featured quite prominently on the research agenda of both parliamentary and EU scholars, with several comparative research projects on national parliamentary scrutiny of EU policies completed during the first decade of the new millennium (Auel & Benz, 2005; Barrett, 2008; Maurer & Wessels, 2001; O´Brennan & Raunio, 2007; Tans, Zoethout, & Peters, 2007) .
Thanks to this lively academic debate, we are now in a much better position to evaluate the ways in which national legislatures are affected by and get involved in European politics. While national parliaments have certainly been late adapters to integration, there is no doubt that they can exercise tighter scrutiny of their important European issues and their national implications' (Auel, 2007, p. 498) , but whether they actually do so remains largely unknown.
The objective of this volume is to provide first and (necessarily) preliminary answers to these important and until now unanswered questions. The next section of this introductory article introduces parliamentary means of communication and discusses parliamentary incentives and disincentives 'to go public' in EU politics.
The second section outlines the structure and results of this volume.
Parliamentary Communication in EU Affairs: Means and (Dis)Incentives
The general research question of this volume is whether and how national parliaments communicate EU affairs. Communication is a two-way process that entails not only providing information, explanations and justifications, but also listening to others. It has been argued that the communication function is best achieved through frequent personal contact between the representatives and the represented (Fenno, 1978) . In the short run, the argument goes, such close contact means that the representative hears about opinions and views first hand and can directly respond to them. In the long run, the expectation is that such personal contacts will build trust. However, people are not only hard to find (Fenno, 1978, p. 234) which the measures and actions of government are debated and scrutinised on behalf of citizens, and through which the concerns of citizens … may be voiced. The extent to which they carry out such actions, and are seen by citizens to carry out such actions, may be argued to constitute the essential underpinning of legitimacy of the political system in the eyes of electors' (Norton, 1998, p. 1, emphasis added (Lord & Pollak, 2010, p. 977f.) . But parliamentary debates provide the means by which the justifications of some (government or governing parties) can be continuously challenged by others within (the opposition) and outside of the parliamentary arena (media, interest groups and so on) and thus be exposed to the 'best of disinfectants, sunshine' (Brandeis, 1913, p. 11) .
Transparency in Parliamentary Committees
Whether committees meet in public can have a major impact on the ability of the electorate to follow parliamentary work. Despite significant cross-national variation, the handling of EU affairs has gradually become more transparent and public in national parliaments. According to COSAC (2009), in around half of the lower houses of national parliaments (14/27) the European Affairs Committees (EAC) meet in public.
However, it is difficult to distinguish clearly between public and private EAC meetings. The main problem is that some do sit in camera, but publish the minutes on the web afterwards or allow the press to be present (for example, Cyprus, Estonia, France and Spain). This means that information on the proceedings is basically public, even if the actual meetings are not. One could even argue that providing minutesor streams on the web may be more important as it provides regular information to a larger audience than attendance at meetings, which is necessarily limited. In turn, most EACs have the option to either close part of their otherwise public meetings (such restrictive practices being normally used in connection with more sensitive EU matters, for instance, security policy, or perhaps when the minister appears in the committee before a council meeting).
Parliamentary Questions
While there is variation with respect to the openness of committees, parliamentary questions are accessible to the public throughout the EU. Parliamentary questions are particularly interesting as they are multifunctional, and MPs ask questions for several reasons. Among the most important of these are asking for information, committing the government to making a public formal statement and pressing it for action, defending constituency interests, and informing the policy-makers of problems they might be unfamiliar with. The attractiveness of parliamentary questions is enhanced by the fact that MPs or parliamentary party groups can practically raise any issue they want. 'Parliamentary question time' also seems to gain more attention in the media than other parliamentary activities (Salmond, 2013) .Parliamentary questions are used in every EU national legislature, but there is variation between the parliaments regarding both the types of questions used and the procedural details concerning the submission and answering of questions (Russo &Wiberg, 2010; Strøm, Müller, & Bergman, 2003) .
Informing the Electorate
One of the classic functions of parliaments is that of informing the public about political matters. Citizens can obviously learn about policy issues through all of the other above-mentioned means of parliamentary communication. Here, however, we refer specifically to means of making information and documents available to the public. Parliaments as institutions can provide information about the EU to the electorate, for example online or through their information offices. This can include original EU documents, documents produced by the national government or by parliaments themselves -such as stenographic minutes, opinions or reports of the EACs -but also information on European institutions, policies and procedures or the involvement of parliament in EU politics more generally. In addition, political parties and MPs can provide information through the media, especially the social media, by emphasising European policies in their programmes or through more direct means such as party events or public talks.
Is Anyone Listening? The Importance of Media Coverage
Finally, any discussion of parliamentary communication remains incomplete without the distinction between two kinds of openness of a political system: transparency and publicity (Hüller, 2007) . While transparency requires that information is publicly available, publicity is only achieved if citizens are actually aware of the information. While parliamentary information and communication can, of course, be directly accessed via the various means discussed above, citizens experience politics primarily indirectly through the media. This raises the question to what extent the national media consider parliamentary activities in EU affairs newsworthy. Due to the 'digitalization of traditional media spheres and the practices of publishing, sharing and commenting political news online' (Michailidou & Trenz, 2013, p. 262) , parliaments have to compete for media attention in an increasingly unpredictable and fluid public arena. Since the seminal study of Galtung and Ruge, (1965) , news value research has identified a variety of factors impacting news selection that is too broad to be discussed here in detail (for an overview see O'Neill & Harcup, 2009 ). However, a plausible hypothesis based on this research is that media coverage in general depends both on the salience of 'Europe' in the country (though not necessarily the degree of Euroscepticism, see Brüggemann & Kleinenvon Königslöw, 2009 ) and on the level of party competition over Europe -the more fiercely parties, and their prominent (famous) MPs in particular, fight (entertainingly) over the EU, the more the media should cover parliamentary involvement in EU affairs.
(Dis)Incentives for Going 'Public' in EU Affairs
While parliamentary information and communication is easily demanded and justified, the question remains:
what are the incentives for MPs and political parties to do so in EU affairs? Considering that re-election is the primary goal of most MPs and their parties, we expect them to have greater incentives to engage publicly with EU affairs in member states where EU issues are more salient and public opinion is generally more critical of EU integration (Raunio, 2005; Saalfeld, 2005) . This will signal to the voters that they are doing their job of representing voter interests and of controlling the government in EU politics. Where, in contrast, European affairs play no role in voting decisions or where the permissive consensus prevails, there are far fewer electoral benefits to be gained from investing in public activities.
Second, MPs will engage in public activities if they expect a payoff in terms of policy influence and control.
Indeed, parliamentary resolutions and mandates may have a greater impact on the government's negotiation position if made publicly, because this will make it more difficult for the government to ignore or circumvent them in the Council negotiations (for example through abstentions). In addition, publicity strengthens parliamentary control through debates or questions. While critical questioning behind closed doors may be unpleasant for ministers, having to defend their European policies in public is much more uncomfortable due to the potential negative publicity and public embarrassment. To what extent especially governing parties and MPs make use of these advantages will also depend on how much they trust the government to represent their policy preferences in EU negotiations (Saalfeld, 2003) . This trust can be assumed to be greatest in the case of single-party governments. Although governing party MPs and ministers may not agree on every single issue, we can expect their interests to be fairly similar -unless the party is deeply internally divided over the EU. Divergent preferences and thus less trust, however, can be expected for coalition governments.
Here, coalition partners not only have to negotiate compromises, but they also have a stronger incentive to control the other coalition partners' members of government publicly. Trust can finally be considered lowest in the case of minority governments that cannot rely on the trust and support of a loyal majority in parliament.
However, there are also a number of reasons why parties and MPs may generally prefer to conduct their EU business away from the prying eyes of the public. Negotiations between government and parliament (and especially between the cabinet and its party groups) are clearly facilitated by closed doors. The establishment of EACs reduces the use of plenary, as the former coordinate parliamentary work in EU matters and are often authorised to speak on behalf of the whole parliament in these issues. While MPs may defend committee deliberations behind closed doors with the need to further national interests and to allow confidential exchange of views between government and parliament, this mechanism clearly also serves the interests of the mainstream parties. Governing parties in particular may want to monitor the government behind closed doors without public criticism that might damage the reputation of the cabinet (Auel, 2007) .
Indeed, main parties in several EU countries, especially in the Nordic region, have deliberately 'de-politicised' European integration through cross-party cooperation in the EAC with the aim of manufacturing consensus in national integration policy (Bergman & Damgaard, 2000) .
In addition, focusing on EU matters may not be a very attractive option for most parties or MPs from an electoral perspective either. In terms of re-election, specific EU policies can be important for their constituencies (for example, in terms of attracting regional policy funds), but not necessarily for the voters in general, who still base their voting choices primarily on domestic issues. 3 What is more, for many parties the costs of engaging in public activities on Europe may even outweigh any potential benefits. Regardless of the data used, there is a consistent body of work showing that national mainstream parties across the EU are ideologically less cohesive on integration than in traditional socio-economic issues that dominate domestic political discourse (for example, Hooghe & Marks, 2007; Marks & Steenbergen, 2004) . Thus, the issue of European integration may threaten the internal cohesiveness of political parties, and party leaders may be reluctant to emphasise an issue that threatens to divide their party since disunity may reduce a party's electoral popularity. Despite intra-party dissent, mainstream parties are also generally more supportive of integration than their voters (Mattila & Raunio, 2012) , and this can impact negatively on their vote shares in elections (Hobolt, Spoon, & Tilley, 2009 ). For mainstream parties, EU issue voting is thus often more of a liability than an asset (De Vries, 2010) and avoiding public activities related to EU affairs may therefore be a logical response from parties aiming at electoral success.
Overview of this Volume
Overall, the contributions in this volume paint a rather sobering picture of parliamentary communication in governing parties defending the EU and using it to legitimate their programmes and budgetary decisions, while opposition to Europe comes mainly from smaller and ideologically radical parties. Yet while he observed a slowly growing politicisation of EU issues in Italy, the overall party consensus on EU matters in both Spain and Italy implies that there are no real debates on European issues. In addition, especially in budgetary debates, the EU is often seen or portrayed as an external constraint, which contributes to the depoliticisation of national politics.
The article by Pieter de Wilde assesses the explanatory power of European integration theory for the politicisation of the EU in mass media and national parliaments. By comparing debates on the EU budget in newspapers and in parliamentary plenary sessions in the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland, it investigates how visible the EU is, who communicates and how sense is made of EU issues. De Wilde shows that the politicisation of EU budget differs mostly between mass media and parliaments, rather than across countries or over time. While the visibility of EU issues has risen in both arenas, corresponding to the increased powers of the Union, different institutional operating logics explain best which actors dominate the debates and how EU issues are framed. Italso suggests that regardless of the extent to which parliaments perform their communicative role, parliamentary communication is very rarely reported by the media: the extent to which parliaments publicly debate EU affairs, and thus 'transparency', only marginally affects the 'publicity'
in the sense of reaching mass audiences through media coverage. To conclude, the studies in this collection clearly suggest that so far most parliaments seem not to live up to their task of bringing 'Europe' closer to the citizens or enabling them to make informed political choices and to exercise democratic control in EU affairs. 
